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I. AMERICA THE VIRTUAL:  SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND 
INTEROPERABILITY IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD 
Cyberthreats recently overtook terrorism as the number one global 
threat to America, according to the 2013 global threat assessment 
performed by the U.S. intelligence community.1  This special issue of 
the American University Law Review represents the culmination of a 
concerted effort to bring together scholars, legal practitioners, 
industry representatives, and government officials to discuss and 
debate the pressing issues surrounding cybersecurity in today’s 
increasingly interconnected environment.  This effort began in 
October 2012 with a public symposium entitled America the Virtual:  
Security, Privacy, and Interoperability in an Interconnected World.  One of 
the principal themes of the symposium was the growing threat that 
online security breaches present to business, government, and 
individual citizens.  This Law Review issue offers reflections on the 
symposium, original scholarship, and commentary that we hope will 
further advance the debate. 
A. Beyond the Fortress 
Melanie Teplinsky delivered the opening remarks at the 
symposium in her speech entitled Beyond the Fortress.2  She explained 
that, for over a decade, the cornerstone of the U.S. approach to 
cybersecurity has been vulnerability mitigation; that is building 
stronger fortresses to protect against cyberthreats.  While fortification 
may offer protection against some cyberthreat actors, Teplinsky 
argued that determined threat actors have the time, resources, and 
motivation to defeat even the most extensive fortification.  Such 
determined actors may include nation-states, terrorists, and 
cybercriminals. 
Teplinsky described the special challenge that nation-state 
cyberthreat actors pose to our economic and national security.  First, 
nation-state sponsored cyberespionage poses a serious threat to U.S. 
economic security.  State-sanctioned Chinese hackers are believed to 
have been stealing not only military secrets, but valuable corporate 
intellectual property for over a decade, to the detriment of America’s 
                                                 
 1. See Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: 
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf. 
 2. Welcome Remarks, AM. U. L. REV., http://aulawreview.org/index.php?view=vidlink 
&catid=1:symposium-2012&id=154:welcome-remarks&option=com_vidlinks&Itemid=150 
 (last visited June 15, 2013). 
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long-term competitiveness.3  Prominent examples of alleged Chinese 
cyberoperations include Byzantine Hades,4 Night Dragon,5 Operation 
Aurora,6 and Operation Shady Rat.7  Teplinsky also addressed the 
                                                 
 3. Michael Riley & Dune Lawrence, Hackers Linked to China’s Army Seen From EU 
to D.C., BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012 
-07-26/china-hackers-hit-eu-point-man-and-d-c-with-byzantine-candor.html (reporting 
that the stolen information includes seismic maps from oil companies, trade secrets 
from patent law firms, and market analysis from investment banks). 
 4. Byzantine Hades refers to a decade-long series of attacks believed to have 
been perpetrated by the Chinese military.  Brian Grow & Mark Hosenball, Special 
Report:  In Cyberspy vs. Cyberspy, China Has the Edge, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2011, 3:52 PM) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/14/us-china-usa-cyberespionage-idUSTRE 
73D24220110414 (announcing that secret U.S. State Department cables reveal that 
the Chinese military was involved in “Byzantine Hades, a series of systems breaches, 
and that  “[a]n April 2009 cable even pinpoints the attacks to a specific unit of 
China’s People’s Liberation Army”).  These attacks are believed to have resulted in 
the exfiltration of terabytes of sensitive information from the U.S. government and 
private sector companies, including “designs for multi-billion dollar weapons 
systems.”  Id.; see also Jessica Bourquin, The Evolution of Cyber Espionage:  A Case for 
an Offensive U.S. Counterintelligence Strategy 13 (Oct. 14, 2011) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, Utica College) available at https://www.treadstone71.com/index.php/news-info-
whitepapers/masters-in-cybersecurity-intelligence-and-forensics/doc_download/48-the-
evolution-of-cyber-espionage-jessica-bourquin; Michael Riley & John Walcott, China-Based 
Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2011, 8:47 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-13/china-based-hacking-of-760-companies 
-reflects-undeclared-global-cyber-war.html (noting that the target companies include 
Google Inc., Intel Corp., and smaller companies like iBahn, a provider of Internet 
services to hotels); Mathew J. Schwartz, Leaked Cables Indicate Chinese Military 
Hackers Attacked U.S., INFORMATIONWEEK SEC. (Apr. 19, 2011, 1:09 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/leaked-cables-indicate-chinese-
military/229401866 (revealing that Chinese spear-phishing attacks have targeted U.S. 
government agencies since 2002). 
 5. Night Dragon is the code name for a cyberespionage campaign leveled against 
six global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, including Exxon Mobil, Royal 
Dutch Shell, and BP.  The attack, which is believed to have lasted from 2008–2011, has 
been described as a “systemic long-term compromise of [the] Western oil and gas 
industry.”  DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, MCAFEE, REVEALED: OPERATION SHADY RAT 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-
rat.pdf.  Cyberspies are alleged to have stolen valuable intellectual property, 
including bidding information; prospecting data, including computerized 
topographical maps worth “millions of dollars” that show locations of potential oil 
reserves; and highly sensitive confidential business information.  Michael Riley, 
Exxon, Shell, BP Said To Have Been Hacked Through Chinese Internet Servers, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 24, 2011, 3:26 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-24/exxon-
shell-bp-said-to-have-been-hacked-through-chinese-internet-servers.html  The tools, 
techniques, and network activities associated with the attack were traced back to 
China.  ALPEROVITCH, supra, at 2. 
 6. Operation Aurora refers to a successful cyberespionage campaign against 
Google and thirty-three other major U.S. companies (reportedly including Intel, 
Dow Chemical, Morgan Stanley, and computer security guru Symantec).  Scott Shane 
& Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html (reporting 
that leaked American diplomatic cables indicate that “China’s Politburo directed the 
intrusion into Google’s computer systems” and that the “Google hacking was part of 
a coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out [in part] by government 
operatives”).  While reports initially suggested that the cyberspies were primarily trying to 
hack into Gmail accounts of Chinese dissidents as part of an effort to quell dissent, 
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national security threat posed by nation-state supported cyberattacks 
on critical infrastructure (CI), such as the August 2012 attack on the 
world’s largest oil company, Saudi Aramco.8 
Teplinsky concluded that U.S. cybersecurity policy needs to be 
based not only on vulnerability mitigation, but also on threat 
deterrence.  She emphasized the need to utilize all elements of 
national power—military, economic, and diplomatic—to deter 
nation-state actors from engaging in cyberespionage and cyberwar.  
She also suggested that increased attention to the private sector’s role 
in deterrence may be warranted because the private sector owns the 
vast majority of CI in the United States,9 is agile, and has more “eyes 
on the ground” than the government.  In addition, the private sector 
may be able to help identify actors engaged in cyberespionage and 
sophisticated cyberattacks and help raise the cost of engaging in such 
activities. 
B. The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable, and 
Intelligent 
Cybersecurity poses particularly acute challenges for critical 
components of the national infrastructure.  The first symposium 
panel, entitled The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable 
and Intelligent,10 examined cybersecurity implications for standards 
development within the electric power and healthcare industries. 
Jorge Contreras, Associate Professor at American University, 
                                                 
security experts later opined that the cyberspies were in fact targeting Google’s sensitive 
systems and intellectual property.  David Drummond, A New Approach to China, GOOGLE 
OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-
approach-to-china.html. 
 7. Operation Shady RAT refers to a five-year cyberspying campaign allegedly 
perpetrated by the Chinese that successfully penetrated the computer networks of 
more than seventy governments and major corporations, including thirteen defense 
contractors, in fourteen countries.  Approximately fifty of the targets were in the 
United States. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 5, at 3–4; see Dean Takahashi, Black Hat’s 
Spotlight Falls on McAfee’s Dmitri Alperovitch for Uncovering Cyber Spying, VENTUREBEAT 
(Aug. 4, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/08/04/black-hats-spotlight-
falls-on-mcafees-dmitri-alperovitch-for-uncovering-cyber-spying (quoting Alperovitch 
describing Operation “Shady RAT” as the “biggest transfer of wealth in terms of 
intellectual property in human history”). 
 8. See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 12, 2012, 7:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044465 
7804578052931555576700.html (reporting that the attack used a computer virus to 
destroy data on 30,000 Saudi Aramco computers). 
 9. Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/ 
critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships (last visited June 15, 2013). 
 10. Panel 1: The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable, and Intelligent, 
AM. U. L. REV., http://aulawreview.org/index.php?view=vidlink&catid=1:symposium-
2012&id=155:promise-and-peril-of-interconnectivity&option=com_vidlinks&Itemid=150 
(last visited June 15, 2013). 
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Washington College of Law, moderated this panel.  Professor 
Contreras, who teaches and writes about technical standardization, 
pointed out that standards are necessary for the interoperability of 
products by multiple vendors.  Interoperability is critical in 
communications and national infrastructure, including the national 
power grid and the medical and financial establishments.  The result 
of the tens of thousands of standards in use today, he observed, is a 
world that is massively interconnected.  Professor Contreras then 
raised the following question:  does interoperability in critical 
infrastructural assets present additional cybersecurity and privacy 
challenges, or does it help to prevent and hinder cybersecurity risks? 
To set the stage, Tom Kellerman, Vice President of Cybersecurity 
for TrendMicro,11 gave preliminary remarks on technological 
approaches to cyber defense. 
Kellerman emphasized that understanding cyber offense informs 
cyber defense, and he focused on the importance of understanding 
one’s cyberadversaries.  Describing the current cyberthreat 
landscape, Kellerman addressed the proliferation of targeted attacks, 
professionalization of cybercrime, automation and commoditization 
of cyberattack tools, and the evolution of mobile threats, including 
the explosion in use of mobile malware.  Kellerman also identified 
several recent IT-related trends that challenge our ability to secure 
cyberspace, such as the migration to cloud computing, the 
consumerization of IT (and the associated “bring your own device” 
phenomenon), the rise of social networking and social media, and 
the explosion in the use of mobile devices.  To address the evolution 
of the cyberthreat landscape, Kellerman urged the development of 
improved standards for browser security, application security, and e-
mail authentication. 
Following Kellerman’s remarks, Dr. George Arnold, National 
Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability at the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), described the massive 
networking effort currently underway to connect and bring 
intelligence to the disparate elements of the national power grid.  
Today’s electrical grid, which comprises more than 17,000 power 
plants, 165,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines and 3200 
                                                 
 11. Kellerman is a former Commissioner for the Commission on Cyber Security 
for the 44th Presidency, serves on the Board of the National Cyber Security Alliance, 
and is an adjunct professor at American University’s School of International Service. 
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different electrical utility companies,12 relies on an infrastructure that 
has remained largely unchanged for a century.  The current Smart 
Grid effort that NIST coordinates seeks to improve grid efficiency, 
reliability, and sustainability by using a new generation of smart 
meters, network sensors, distributed microgrids, and sophisticated 
monitoring and management systems.  With increased 
interconnection, however, comes increased vulnerability, both to 
external and internal threats.13  NIST, other agencies, and the private 
sector standards-development organizations charged with developing 
the protocols that will enable Smart Grid interoperability have placed 
a high priority on securing this key national resource.  In addition to 
security issues, the national Smart Grid will present challenges for 
maintaining the privacy of data gathered from consumers and 
households across the country.  In an integrated Smart Grid system, 
information ranging from subscribers’ financial and payment data, to 
energy usage habits, scheduling of daily activities and vacations, and 
the type and quantity of electrical appliances and devices used, will all 
become vulnerable to external appropriation and inappropriate 
use.14 
Security and privacy issues also play a prominent role in the design 
of standards for interoperable healthcare systems.  Tim Andrews, Vice 
President of the Booz Allen Hamilton health team, described the 
potential benefits of moving toward intelligent, interconnected 
healthcare records systems. These include first order patient care 
consistency and improvement and second order population-level data 
analysis for epidemiological and public health applications.  With 
interconnection, however, come heightened risks and vulnerabilities.  
Health records contain a wealth of personal information about 
individuals that, if compromised, could give rise to identity theft, 
financial embezzlement, and healthcare fraud.  The medical and 
healthcare industry is highly fragmented and decentralized, even 
more than the electrical power grid, involving millions of 
independent physicians, hospitals, and software vendors.15  
                                                 
 12. George W. Arnold, Remarks at the American University Law Review 
Symposium:  The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable, and 
Intelligent:  A Smartgrid Perspective (Oct. 25, 2012) (on file with law review). 
 13. See, e.g., Richard Stone, A Call to Cyber Arms, 339 SCIENCE 1026, 1027 (2013) 
(noting a 2011 report published by Chinese researchers that describes 
“vulnerabilities in the western U.S. power grid”). 
 14. See, e.g., Ian Brown, Britain’s Smart Meter Programme: A Case Study in Privacy by 
Design, INT’L REV. L COMPUTER & TECH. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2215646. 
 15. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Health-Care Sector Vulnerable to Hackers, Researchers Say, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/health-
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Standardizing and securing a network comprised of disparate and 
uncoordinated elements will be a tremendous technological and 
legal challenge. 
C. Cybersecurity & the Law:  Efforts to Address Cybersecurity 
The symposium’s second panel focused on recent legal and 
legislative efforts to address cybersecurity and preserve civil liberties.16  
Lucy Thompson, Chair of the ABA Section of Science & Technology 
Law, moderated this panel and helped to draw out several themes.  
First, the panelists emphasized that cybersecurity is a complex 
problem with many different facets, and that legal and legislative 
analyses of cybersecurity issues must distinguish not only among 
different cyberthreat actors, such as nation-states, terrorists, 
criminals, and malicious hackers, but also among different types of 
cyberthreats.  Such cyberthreats include threats to critical 
infrastructure, which could lead to loss of life or significant damage 
to our economy; and threats to intellectual property, which could 
affect our nation’s long-term competitiveness. 
Second, the panelists generally agreed with Mike McNerney, 
former Cyber Policy Advisory in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and Eric Wenger, Policy Counsel for Microsoft, that the 
ongoing cybersecurity debate in Congress implicates many 
longstanding and controversial issues.  For example, how do we 
balance improved cybersecurity that comes in the form of 
information-sharing or continuous monitoring against the 
importance of protecting privacy and civil liberties?  Can the market 
be relied upon to police itself when it comes to protecting critical 
infrastructure?  What is the government’s proper role vis-à-vis the 
private sector in “.com” cybersecurity given that the Internet is largely 
private-sector-owned and operated?  Would legislative action, such as 
setting voluntary cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure as 
proposed in the Cybersecurity Act of 2012,17 incentivize the right 
behavior or inhibit innovation? 
Wenger pointed out that the cybersecurity debate in the 112th 
Congress reflected a fundamental disagreement over what the 
                                                 
care-sector-vulnerable-to-hackers-researchers-say/2012/12/25/72933598-3e50-11e2-ae 
43-cf491b837f7b_story.html (noting that many medical device manufacturers do not 
consider cybersecurity risks in manufacturing and medical professionals themselves 
have already made mistakes leading to breaches). 
 16. Panel 2: Cybersecurity & Law, AM. U. L. REV., http://aulawreview.org/index.php 
?view=vidlink&catid=1:symposium-2012&id=156:cybersecurity-and-law&option=com_ 
vidlinks&Itemid=150 (last visited June 15, 2013). 
 17. S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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cybersecurity problem is and which government institution is best 
situated to address it.  Some believe that the most important 
cybersecurity problem to be solved in the near term is ensuring a 
better flow of information between the private and public sectors and 
that the intelligence community has the necessary expertise to lead 
the way.  The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act18 
(CISPA), the narrow information sharing legislation that passed the 
House in April 2012, is based on this premise.  Others believe that 
the most important cybersecurity issue is ensuring that the private 
sector adequately adheres to standards for critical infrastructure 
protection and propose that the Department of Homeland Security 
take the lead in creating a regulatory model.  Both the Senate’s 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 and its Revised Cybersecurity Act of 201219 
were based on this premise. 
The panelists also discussed the role of the market in cybersecurity.  
Harriet Pearson, a partner at Hogan Lovells working in the 
Government Regulatory Practice and Privacy and Information 
Management Practice and former Chief Privacy Officer for IBM, 
eloquently argued that we are living in a historic age in which the 
rapidity of technological change is putting incredible pressure on our 
business and government institutions.  Pearson discussed how 
technology is fundamentally altering the way in which our 
organizations work and suggested that law, policy, and market 
mechanisms are having difficulty keeping pace with these rapid 
changes.  She argued that the market is responding to the need for 
greater security of various types, and that criticisms of the market for 
not moving fast enough may be overstated given the enormity of the 
changes the market must accommodate.  For example, Pearson 
argued that industry has made significant changes to address 
cybercrime and identity theft, and that we are only in the early stages 
of market response to intellectual property (IP) theft.  Finally, she 
emphasized the need to find policies that will incent the right 
behaviors without dampening the innovation needed for both good 
security and a robust economy. 
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, a partner at Monument Policy Group, built 
on Pearson’s remarks, adding that although companies take 
cybersecurity quite seriously, they are challenged by its increasing 
complexity, including greater interconnectedness, increased reliance 
on cloud services, and the trend toward “bring your own device,” which 
                                                 
 18. H.R. 624 (113th Cong.) (2012). 
 19. S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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blurs the line between personal and business use of networked devices. 
McNerney noted that despite recent SEC guidelines requiring 
companies to report “material” information regarding cybersecurity 
risks and cyber incidents,20 inadequate cybersecurity does not appear 
to affect the valuation of today’s companies; he focused on the need 
for maturation in insurance and litigation to change this dynamic.  
McNerney’s comments led to a robust discussion regarding the 
difficulty of assessing both the value of cybersecurity and the costs of 
cybersecurity failures and the implications of this for the nascent 
cyberinsurance market. 
D. Internet Governance:  Who Will Lead the Way? 
The third panel of the symposium, entitled Internet Governance:  
Who Will Lead the Way?, addressed the role of Internet governance in 
shaping the cybersecurity technological, legal, and policy 
environment.21  Laura DeNardis, Associate Professor at American 
University, School of Communication, moderated this panel.  She 
pointed out that Internet governance goes beyond government 
policies and national law, as technical design also plays a 
governmental role, corporate policies, and global institutions.  The 
direction of Internet governance, often concealed in technical 
complexities, is of extreme importance because it will determine the 
direction of civil liberties online.  One theme addressed was the 
importance of preserving the multistakeholder model of Internet 
governance that includes the involvement of private industry, civil 
society, new global Internet governance institutions, and 
governments.22  Paul Brigner, Regional Director of the North 
American Bureau of the Internet Society (ISOC), emphasized that 
the security and stability of the Internet depend on the preservation 
of three Internet characteristics:  (1) permissionless innovation,23 (2) 
open access, and (3) collaboration.  Brigner raised concerns about 
international proposals that might threaten these ideals by imposing 
a telecommunications model of regulation onto the Internet, 
                                                 
 20. DIV. OF CORPORATE FIN., SEC, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2, CYBERSECURITY 
(Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. 
 21. Panel 3: Internet Governance: Who Will Lead the Way?, AM. U. L. REV., 
http://aulawreview.org/index.php?view=vidlink&catid=1:symposium-2012&id=157: 
internet-governance-who-leads&option=com_vidlinks&Itemid=150 (last visited June 
15, 2013). 
 22. INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, ICANN ANNUAL REPORT 
2011 (2011) [hereinafter ICCAN REPORT], available at http://www.icann.org/en/about 
/annual-report/annual-report-2011-en.pdf. 
 23. Permissionless innovation is innovation that can be accomplished without the 
necessity for obtaining intellectual property permissions or clearances. 
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affecting issues such as cybersecurity, billing, and quality of service.  
He also stressed that meetings addressing the future of Internet 
governance should be open and transparent, providing avenues for 
multistakeholder dialogue and input.  The Internet’s role as a shared 
resource and its architectural blurring of time and space distinctions 
present unique governance challenges, according to Rashmi 
Rangnath, Director of the Global Knowledge Initiative at Global 
Knowledge.  Coordination is necessary for the Internet to function, 
but who has the legitimacy to provide this coordination?  Rangnath 
explained that governance is the act of affecting behavior, ideally 
reflecting common values.  While democracy is the ideal model in the 
physical world, multistakeholderism is the ideal model in the virtual 
world.  Multistakeholder Internet governance is not a monolithic 
area, but it involves multiple policy areas such as infrastructure, 
applications, protocols, and content.24  As such, Internet governance 
mechanisms range from tools as diverse as copyright enforcement to 
net neutrality policies to privacy. 
Difficult questions about multistakeholderism, particularly in the 
area of privacy, include the appropriate role of governments and 
other specific stakeholders and the appropriate international forums 
for input from civil society.  What should the respective roles of the 
various stakeholders be?  J. Beckwith Burr, Chief Privacy Officer and 
Deputy General Counsel at Neustar, addressed the question of the 
role of government in Internet governance and, particularly, how 
privacy plays out in a virtual world without national borders.  One 
typically thinks about public policy as mediated by governments but 
this is not always the case in the Internet governance realm.  In the 
view of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), decisions about the operation of country code top-level 
domains should be managed by the associated country and Internet 
community.25  But even in such a case, what if the relevant country 
passes a law that compromises Internet principles? 
Privacy is a similarly complex issue in the multistakeholder world.  
International trade treaties, for example, usually include privacy 
rules.  But there are significant open debates about privacy, including 
work in the standards body known as the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) to create “do not track” mechanisms and work in 
open international debates about what information should be made 
                                                 
 24. Id. at 9. 
 25. Id. at 21. 
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public when you register a domain name.26  Thomas Smedinghoff, 
partner at Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP working in the Intellectual 
Property, Privacy and Data Protection, and Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications Practice Groups, provided specific examples of 
online privacy complexities, focusing on governance of specific data 
transactions in various contexts. 
E. Keynote:  Leap-Ahead Privacy as a Government Responsibility in the 
Digital Age 
The privacy threats raised by previous speakers were echoed in the 
keynote address delivered by Ivan Fong, Senior Vice President, Legal 
Affairs, and General Counsel of 3M Co. and former General Counsel 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,27 entitled Leap-Ahead 
Privacy as a Government Responsibility in the Digital Age.28  Given the 
many threats incipient in the online environment, Fong identified 
two primary drivers justifying increased governmental involvement in 
securing cyberspace:  first, the government depends heavily on 
technology and cyberspace for its own operations; and second, 
government has a unique vantage point from which to observe and 
understand global economic, political, and technological forces that 
could give rise to cyberthreats.  He assessed the range of current laws 
and regulations that address cybersecurity issues, either directly or 
indirectly, and found them largely inadequate.  Thus, Fong 
recommended that government “leap ahead” with progressive, 
forward-looking data privacy and security legislation and regulation, 
rather than waiting for incremental change to occur through judicial 
intervention. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The world of cybersecurity is fast-moving and several important 
developments have arisen since the symposium was held in October 
2012.  First, in February 2013, President Obama issued an Executive 
Order (EO) on cybersecurity that addressed information sharing as 
                                                 
 26. See  Peter Swire, Full Steam on Do Not Track, W3C BLOG (Feb. 12, 2013, 11:59 
PM), http://www.w3.org/QA/2013/02/full_steam_on_do_not_track.html (reporting 
that the W3C and a multitude of stakeholders have identified criteria for a successful 
do not track standard and will now focus on its international aspects).  
 27. Although Mr. Fong delivered these remarks after his departure from his 
position as General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 
October 2012, they were prepared by Mr. Fong in his official capacity during his 
tenure with DHS and thus represent views consistent with those of the 
Administration. 
 28. Ivan Fong, Leap-Ahead Privacy as a Government Responsibility in the Digital Age, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 1131 (2013). 
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well as the development and implementation of risk-based 
cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure.29  With respect to 
information sharing, the EO confirmed that it is U.S. policy to 
improve cybersecurity information sharing by increasing the “volume, 
timeliness, and quality” of cyberthreat information shared with the 
U.S. private sector.30  The EO also put the President’s imprimatur on 
the planned expansion to critical infrastructure companies of an 
existing information-sharing program between the government and 
defense industrial base companies.31  Moreover, under the EO, 
unclassified versions of reports of cyberthreats to the United States 
that identify a specific target must be rapidly disseminated to the 
target.32  In addition to information sharing, the Order calls for the 
collaborative development and voluntary adoption of a new 
cybersecurity framework to include risk-based cybersecurity standards 
for critical infrastructure.33 
Second, in March 2013, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) identified cyber as the top global threat facing America, 
stating “it’s hard to overemphasize its significance.”34  The next day, 
President Obama invited select CEOs of CI companies directly to the 
White House to discuss cybersecurity.35 
Third, the 2013 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a classified 
document reflecting the “consensus view of the U.S. intelligence 
community,”36 reportedly concluded that “the United States is the 
target of a massive, sustained cyber-espionage campaign that is 
threatening the country’s economic competitiveness.”37  According to 
press reports, the NIE identifies China “as the country most 
                                                 
 29. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the 
S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of James R. Clapper, 
Director of National Intelligence), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ 
Intelligence%20Reports/WWTA%20Remarks%20as%20delivered%2012%20Mar%20 
2013.pdf. 
 35. Alex Mooney, President To Host CEOs in Situation Room for Cyber Security Chat, 
CNN (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:22 PM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/13/president 
-to-host-ceos-in-situation-room-for-cyber-security-chat. 
 36. Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Said To Be Target of Massive Cyber-Espionage 
Campaign, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-
10/world/37026024_1_cyber-espionage-national-counterintelligence-executive-trade-
secrets (“Some officials have pressed for an unclassified summary to be released 
publicly, [but] . . . as a matter of policy, [the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence does] not discuss or acknowledge the existence of NIEs unless directed 
to do so.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 37. Id. 
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aggressively seeking to penetrate the computer systems of American 
businesses and institutions.”38  Just days after the NIE was circulated, 
U.S. information security company Mandiant released a report of 
over sixty pages offering extensive evidence of Chinese espionage,39 
including actual video of physical intrusion activities.40 
Fourth, in the area of technical standards and interoperability, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recently demonstrated a strong 
interest in cybersecurity.  In February 2013, the Commission filed a 
Complaint against HTC America41 alleging that HTC’s smart phones 
and tablet devices contained various security vulnerabilities, and that 
the presence of such vulnerabilities constituted unfair and deceptive 
practices under section 5 of the FTC Act.42  The action was resolved 
with the FTC issuing a Consent Order under which HTC agreed to 
modify specific security vulnerabilities identified by the Commission 
and to report on security compliance for a period of twenty years.43  
Some commentators have expressed concern that the Commission’s 
action against HTC indicates its willingness to dictate cybersecurity 
standards absent any regulatory or legislative guidance regarding the 
scope, nature, or technical details of those standards.44  Peter 
Frechette’s student Note, FTC v. LabMD:  FTC Jurisdiction Over 
Information Security is “Plausible,” but How Far Can It Go?,45 addresses 
precisely these issues. 
Finally, the executive branch has stepped up efforts to deal with 
cyberespionage through diplomatic channels.  In a March 2013 
speech to the Asia Society, Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to 
the President, unequivocally set forth the expectations of the United 
States with respect to China’s role in cyberespionage, saying: 
                                                 
 38. Id.; see also David Barboza, In Wake of Cyberattacks, China Seeks New Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/china-
calls-for-global-hacking-rules.html (“American intelligence officials have . . . said 
privately that they have evidence of Chinese government involvement in the [recent 
hacking] attacks . . . .”). 
 39. MANDIANT, APT1:  EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS (2013), 
available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf. 
 40. APT1:  Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT (Feb. 18, 
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p7FqSav6Ho. 
 41. HTC America is the American arm of HTC, a Chinese company that 
manufactures Android and Windows-based smart phones.  HTC, http://www.htc.com/ 
us (last visited June 15, 2013). 
 42. Complaint, HTC Am., Inc., FTC File No. 122-3049 (Feb. 22, 2013), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1223049/130222htccmpt.pdf. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Allison Grande, With HTC Deal, FTC Claims Power To Set Security Standards, 
LAW360 (Feb. 22, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/417857 
(discussing the HTC and FTC agreement and the industry reaction to it). 
 45. Peter Frechette, Note, FTC v. LabMD:  FTC Jurisdiction Over Information 
Privacy is “Plausible,” But How Far Can It Go?, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1401 (2013). 
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First, we need a recognition of the urgency and scope of this 
problem and the risk it poses—to international trade, to the 
reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall relations.  
Second, Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a 
stop to these activities.  Finally, we need China to engage with us in 
a constructive direct dialogue to establish acceptable norms of 
behavior in cyberspace.46 
President Obama himself addressed the issue of nation-state 
sponsored cyberintrusions in a March 13 interview, stating: “[w]e’ve 
made it very clear to China . . . that, you know, we expect them to 
follow international norms and abide by international rules.”47  When 
newly elected Chinese President Xi Jinping took office on March 14, 
2013, President Obama reportedly called to congratulate Xi and took 
the opportunity to raise U.S. concerns about hacking.48  In the course 
of the call, the two leaders reportedly “committed to engage in an 
ongoing discussion to address the cyber issue.”49 
The conversation between Obama and Xi appears at a minimum to 
have accelerated formal diplomatic engagement on cybersecurity 
between the two countries.  On March 17, 2013, just days after the 
Obama-Xi discussion, the new Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said: “I 
think we should not make groundless accusations against each other, 
and spend more time doing practical things that will contribute to 
cyber-security,”50 and by mid-April, 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry announced that the United States and China had agreed to set 
up a cybersecurity working group.51 
While the increased diplomatic engagement on cybersecurity is 
encouraging, substantive progress will take time, and, as the U.S. 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs has noted: “[i]t’s 
important to have a dialogue on this, but it’s also important that the 
                                                 
 46. Tom Donilon, Nat’l Sec. Advisor to the President, Remarks to the Asia 
Society:  The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013 (Mar. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national 
-security-advisory-president-united-states-a. 
 47. Steve Holland, Obama, China’s Xi Discuss Cybersecurity Dispute in Phone Call, 
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-
usa-china-obama-call-idUSBRE92D11G20130314. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Terrill Yue Jones & Benjamin Kang Lim, China’s New Premier Seeks “New Type” 
of Ties with U.S., REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2013, 4:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/03/17/us-china-parliament-hacking-idUSBRE92G02320130317. 
 51. Terril Yue Jones, U.S., China Agree To Work Together on Cyber Security, REUTERS 
(Apr. 13, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/13/us-china-
us-cyber-idUSBRE93C05T20130413. 
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dialogue be a means to an end, and the end is really ending these 
practices.”52 
III. INSIDE THIS ISSUE 
This special issue of the American University Law Review supplements 
and advances the cybersecurity discussion held during its October 
2012 symposium with a range of articles and commentary covering 
different facets of the growing field of cybersecurity.  In Regulating 
Information Security in the Government Contracting Industry:  Will the 
Rising Tide Lift All the Boats?, Keir Bancroft observes the increasing 
trend of federal agencies to mandate information security in their 
dealings with private contractors.  While Bancroft acknowledges the 
overall societal benefit of reducing cybersecurity risks, he questions 
the degree to which small organizations lacking the requisite 
resources, technology, and experience will be able to comply with 
steadily escalating federal security requirements.  In these cases, he 
argues that emerging businesses may be foreclosed from lucrative 
government contracts.  He then offers several potential solutions that 
the federal government could implement to assist small businesses in 
complying with new cybersecurity requirements. 
In When Cyber Weapons End Up on Private Networks:  Third Amendment 
Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, Alan Butler offers a Third Amendment 
analysis of military cyberoperations.  Butler explores whether, and how, 
the Third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—that prohibits 
quartering soldiers in a house during peacetime without the owner’s 
consent—applies to U.S. military cyberoperations involving 
government placement of software on privately-owned U.S. networks.  
Butler makes a novel argument that military software placed on a 
home or business network constitutes “quartering” of a “soldier” for 
Third Amendment purposes.  He then argues that the Third 
Amendment confers not merely the narrow right to exclude the 
military from one’s house, but the broader right to exclude the 
military from one’s “private property,” including computers and 
network infrastructure.  Building on these arguments, Butler asserts 
that military cyberoperations could implicate the Third Amendment, 
and he concludes by exploring ways to design a national 
cyberoperations strategy informed by Third Amendment principles. 
In Hacker’s Delight:  Law Firm Risk and Liability in the Cyber Age, Mike 
McNerney and Emilian Papadopoulos explore the cybersecurity risks 
and liabilities that law firms face.  McNerney and Papadopoulos begin 
                                                 
 52. Id. 
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by exploring who is targeting law firms for cyberintrusion and why; 
then, he warns that the potential for law firm liability arising out of 
cyberinstrusions may be increasing.  McNerney and Papadopoulos 
caution that law firms affected by a cyberintrusion could be subject to 
federal and state data breach notification requirements and SEC 
disclosure requirements, and that those law firms could face FTC 
enforcement action for inadequate data security in the event of a 
data breach.  Finally, McNerney and Papadopoulos identify several 
practical steps that firms can take to protect themselves:  implement 
best practices in cybersecurity risk management, engage senior 
leadership, encourage a culture of cybersecurity through education 
and implementation of policies to control cyberrisk, harden networks 
by implementing effective network security, and formulate crisis 
response plans. 
In his article Toward Cyber Peace:  Managing Cyber Attacks through 
Polycentric Governance, Scott Shackelford attempts to shed light on the 
debate over cybersecurity by conceptualizing cyberspace as a form of 
“pseudocommons,” a “shared global infrastructure” that is regulated 
by a combination of public and private entities.  Shackelford draws 
on the work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, whose 
groundbreaking work on collective ownership and common resource 
management revolutionized the field; he finds cyberspace susceptible 
to vulnerabilities arising from both the well-known “tragedy of the 
commons” and “anti-commons” paradigms.  After considering 
potential organizational solutions to these problems, he argues that 
cyber peace is most likely to prevail in an environment of polycentric 
decision making, modeled, at least in part, on the participatory, 
bottom-up structure of groups such as the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF). 
In addition to the articles summarized above, this issue includes 
three student-authored scholarly writings, each of which addresses a 
discrete, but unsettled, question of cybersecurity law.  In the student 
Comment Identity Crisis:  Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing 
for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, Miles 
Galbraith explores a circuit split on the issue of standing in data 
breach cases.  Galbraith agrees with the holdings of the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that an increased risk 
of identity theft arising out of the theft or loss of personal data 
constitutes a cognizable injury for purposes of Article III standing, 
and he rejects the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s view 
that standing is lacking in the absence of actual misuse of 
compromised data.  Galbraith argues that analogous areas of tort law 
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support his conclusion that plaintiffs should have standing because 
theft or loss of personal data constitutes a cognizable injury. 
In the first of two student Notes, FTC v. LabMD:  FTC Jurisdiction 
Over Information Security is “Plausible,” But How Far Can It Go?, Peter 
Frechette addresses the implications of FTC v. LabMD for the FTC’s 
enforcement authority in the data security realm.  Section 5 of the 
FTC Act makes it unlawful to engage in “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce,”53 and Frechette explains how 
LabMD may challenge the FTC’s authority to regulate unfair data 
security practices by way of enforcement actions against companies 
that fail adequately to safeguard sensitive consumer information. 
In the second student Note, Limitations on Employee Liability Under 
the CFAA After WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, Danielle 
Sunberg explores an unresolved three-way circuit split over the 
proper interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
provision criminalizing access to a computer “without authorization” 
or by “exceeding authorized access.”54  At issue is the applicability of 
this provision to rogue employees who access their company’s 
computer network using valid login information and then steal 
confidential data from the network in violation of their employer’s 
terms of use.  Sunberg explains that the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits—adopting a 
contract approach—have held that employees “exceed authorized 
access” when they violate a corporate network’s terms of use; the 
Seventh Circuit—adopting an agency approach—has held that 
authorization to access the network is terminated when an employee 
violates his duty of loyalty to his employer; and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—in WEC—and the Ninth Circuit—
adopting a code-based approach—have held that there is no 
“unauthorized access” when an employee accesses a company 
network using the employee’s valid login credentials.  Sunberg 
explains that the Fourth Circuit’s WEC opinion widened the existing 
circuit split and exacerbated the need for resolution from the 
Supreme Court or Congress55 to provide certainty to employers. 
                                                 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). 
 55. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D–Cal.) has introduced a bill known as “Aaron’s Law” 
to address the circuit split through an amendment to the CFAA, and the House 
held hearings on the CFAA issue on March 13, 2013.  Investigating and Prosecuting 
21st Century Cyber Threats: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Sec. & Investigations of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013).  
Aaron’s Law is named after Aaron Swartz, a brilliant twenty-six-year-old Internet 
activist who tragically committed suicide in January 2013 while facing 
prosecution–and potentially thirty-five years of jail time—for violating the above-
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CONCLUSION 
Cybersecurity and cyberthreats have risen to prominence in the 
national public discourse.  Private industry, governmental actors, and 
civil society have recognized these issues as critical to national 
security, economic competitiveness, and individual rights.  We are 
confident that the timely subjects raised in this issue of the American 
University Law Review represent only the beginning of a debate that is 
sure to continue for years to come. 
                                                 
referenced CFAA provision.  Swartz, who fervently believed that information should 
be made available to the public for free, was being prosecuted for breaking into 
MIT’s computer system and downloading nearly five million articles from a 
subscription-based academic research database called JSTOR. 
